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I. INTRODUCTION 
Religious freedom ensures that every person has the right to explore life’s 
deepest questions and to live out their religious convictions in public life.  Free 
speech similarly ensures that all have the liberty to express their views and 
pursue truth without fear of government punishment.  Free exercise of religion 
and free speech are durable rights that do not turn on cultural popularity or 
                                            
+ Senior Counsel, Senior Vice President of U.S. Legal Division & Communications, Alliance 
Defending Freedom.  Ms. Waggoner was counsel of record for and argued Masterpiece Cakeshop 
and Arlene’s Flowers, and she was counsel for the Petitioners in NIFLA. 
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political power; these freedoms enable us to coexist peacefully with each other 
despite deep differences.  Yet these freedoms are being sorely tested today by 
government efforts to suppress the rights of creative professionals—painters, 
filmmakers, printers, and many others—who in recent years found themselves 
out of step with novel government orthodoxies on marriage and sexuality. 
The United States Supreme Court considered these foundational freedoms in 
three critical cases in its last term: Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission (“Masterpiece I”);1 National Institute of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra;2 and Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees, Council 31.3 
Masterpiece I considered whether the government may lawfully force an 
artist’s hand (and mind) to create art against the artist’s conscience.4  NIFLA 
asked whether the government may compel religious prolife advocates—
pregnancy centers, no less—to promote other groups’ abortion services.5  And 
Janus asked whether the government may compel a non-union public employee 
to subsidize his agency’s union when that employee opposed many of the 
union’s positions.6 
The objecting speakers in each case were protected, building on a legacy of 
First Amendment precedents.  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah7 established that the government must act neutrally when considering a 
religious claimant’s complaint.  West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette8 forbade the state from forcing religious students to salute the 
American flag (even in the midst of World War II, when patriotism was at its 
apogee) because to do so was contrary to their faith and consciences.  Miami 
Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo9 forbade the state from forcing a 
newspaper to publish a third party’s article.  Wooley v. Maynard10 forbade the 
state from forcing an individual to display a government message he disagreed 
with on his license plate.  Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities 
Commission of California11 forbade the state from forcing a utility company to 
send third-party messages in its billing letters.  And Hurley v. Irish-American 
                                            
 1. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).  This 
Supreme Court case is denoted Masterpiece I while a second case, Masterpiece II, is underway in 
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. 
 2. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 3. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 4. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. 
 5. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2379. 
 6. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486. 
 7. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inv. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 8. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631, 641 (1943). 
 9. Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243, 258 (1974). 
 10. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706, 717 (1977). 
 11. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 4 (1986). 
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Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston12 forbade the state from forcing 
parade organizers to allow an unwanted message in their parade. 
This article reviews in Section II the genesis of Masterpiece I and its 
application of well-established religious freedom principles to protect artist Jack 
Phillips’ free exercise rights.  Section III turns to NIFLA and Janus to explain 
how the strict proscriptions against compelled speech may work in tandem with 
religious freedom to protect creative professionals’ rights of conscience.  And 
Section VI discusses how creative professional cases currently in litigation will 
likely benefit from the holdings in Masterpiece I, NIFLA, and Janus.  And 
Section V concludes by highlighting Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers,13 a First 
Amendment case seeking review by the United States Supreme Court. 
The conclusion is that everyone’s freedom is respected when the government 
protects religious freedom and free speech and assiduously avoids compelling 
anyone to speak a message or celebrate an event that violates their core 
convictions. 
II. A MASTERPIECE OF STATE HOSTILITY TO RELIGION: DISPARAGING 
RELIGION AND DEPLOYING DOUBLE STANDARDS 
The artist who wields a painter’s brush or sculptor’s knife should not have the 
government force his hand (or mind) to create against his conscience.  Yet cake 
artist Jack Phillips used both tools when he created custom cakes to celebrate 
marriage, and Colorado brought to bear all the power of the state in an effort to 
force Phillips to create a cake celebrating same-sex marriage, which he could 
not, in good conscience, do. 
Artists by their very nature bring intellectual diversity and creativity to our 
culture, and creative expression is at the core of First Amendment freedom: “The 
Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, including esthetic 
and moral judgments about art and literature, can be formed, tested, and 
expressed . . . . [T]hese judgments are for the individual to make, not for the 
Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.”14 
A. Phillips’ Art 
Jack Phillips would not have created a cake celebrating same-sex marriage for 
anyone, regardless of their sexual orientation, because the message of 
celebrating same-sex marriage conflicted with his Christian belief that God 
created marriage to be a sacred union between one man and one woman, a union 
                                            
 12. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 559 
(1995). 
 13. Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017). 
 14. United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). 
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that represents Christ and His Church.15  In so doing, Phillips acted consistently 
with his faith, as he has since founding Masterpiece Cakeshop in 1993.16  
Phillips carefully chose Masterpiece’s name: it would not be just a bakery, but 
an art gallery of cakes.  With this in mind, Phillips created a Masterpiece logo 
depicting an artist’s paint palate with a paintbrush and whisk. 17 
Phillips approaches cake design as an art form.  He first sketches his concept 
for the cake—a process he often repeats.18  The sketch is then translated to 
sculpture, where he paints elaborate designs, expanding on his themes through 
the form and style of the cake’s decorations.19  He masterfully employs the arts 
of sculpture and painting to create unique works celebrating marriage, with each 
being crafted specifically for a particular wedding couple.20  Indeed, historically 
the wedding cake developed “not as an integral part of a[] meal but as a festive 
or celebratory” component of the newlyweds’ union.21  In modern Western 
culture, the wedding cake has become the iconic centerpiece of the celebration—
a “veritable institution . . . a rite without confirmation.”22  The tradition is rooted 
in Victorian England and became engrained in our society after the Civil War so 
that today ‘“[w]edding cakes are . . . packed with symbolism.’”23  The modern 
wedding cake is a “highly distinctive structure” and serves as a “marker” to 
signify that a wedding has occurred and a marriage has begun.24  The cutting and 
sharing of the cake is typically the first joint act of the marital union25 and is a 
powerful symbol that this celebration is a wedding celebration and no other.26  
Phillips’ work delivers this artistic celebration of marriage powerfully: 
                                            
 15. Joint Appendix at 157, 166–67, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16–111). 
 16. Id. at 157. 
 17. Id. at 160. 
 18. Id. at 161 
 19. Id. at 162 
 20. Id. at 161–62. 
 21. SIMON R. CHARSLEY, WEDDING CAKES AND CULTURAL HISTORY 46 (1992). 
 22. William Woys Weaver, Foreword to CHARSLEY supra note 21; see also CHARSLEY supra 
note 21 at 121; WENDY A. WOLOSON, REFINED TASTES: SUGAR, CONFECTIONERY, AND 
CONSUMERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 168 (2002). 
 23. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1743 (2018) (Thomas, J., and Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(quoting M. KRONDL, SWEET INVENTION: A HISTORY OF DESSERT 321 (2011)). 
 24. Charsley, supra note 21, at 121; see also Brief for Cake Artists as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Neither Party at 7–16, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
 25. Charsley, supra note 21, at 123; CLAIRE STEWART, AS LONG AS WE BOTH SHALL EAT 
137 (2017). 
 26. Charsley, supra note 21, at 123. 
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B. Phillips’ Faith 
At the Cakeshop, Phillips hosts Bible studies, provides free baked goods and 
drinks to homeless individuals, and closes on Sundays to permit his employees 
and himself to attend religious services.27 
But the religious tenet central to this case is that marriage is sacred to Phillips, 
as it is to so many others “who live by their religions.”28  Specifically, Phillips 
holds to the foundational Christian belief that marriage is “the union of one man 
                                            
 27. Order at 4–5, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018) (No. 18-2074). 
 28. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015). 
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and one woman.”29  When a man and a woman wed, it signifies that the “two 
[have] become one flesh” and no one should separate “what God has joined 
together.”30  These tenets are common to many religions and particularly to the 
Abrahamic faiths: Judaism, Islam, and Christianity.31 
Regardless of whether Phillips’ wedding clients plan an overtly religious 
event, he believes that all weddings are sacred and create an inherently religious 
relationship.32  Because weddings and marriage have such religious significance 
to Phillips, it would be sacrilegious for him to apply his art to express an idea 
about marriage that sharply conflicts with his religious beliefs.33  Thus, he will 
not design custom cakes that celebrate any form of marriage other than between 
one man and one woman.34 
Phillips’ exercise of conscience is governed by what the Bible teaches—he 
will not create cakes that express messages that violate his faith.35  When 
someone proposes a cake that conveys a message contrary to biblical teaching, 
Phillips will not create it no matter who asks for it.  Consistent with that stance, 
he has declined to create cakes celebrating Halloween; expressing anti-family 
themes, such as celebrating a divorce; which contain hateful, vulgar, or profane 
messages (such as a cake disparaging gays and lesbians); or which promote 
atheism, racism, or indecency.36 
Phillips’ objections turn on what message is conveyed, not who happens to 
buy or request Phillips’ artwork.  This is clear since Phillips sells his premade 
artwork to anyone for use at any occasion.37  Likewise, Phillips also creates his 
custom artwork for anyone, regardless of his or her status.38  For both his 
premade and custom works, Phillips serves everyone, but he does not 
communicate every message through his art. 
                                            
 29. Joint Appendix at 157, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) (quoting Mark 10:6-9). 
 30. Id. at 157–58. 
 31. Helen M. Alvaré, The Moral Reasoning of Family Law: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 
38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 349, 364, 367–69 (2007). 
 32. Joint Appendix at 166–67, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
 33. Id. at 157–59; see Ephesians 4:29; Ephesians 5:1–14; 1 Timothy 5:22; 1 Corinthians 10:1–
22; 2 Corinthians 6:14–18. 
 34. Joint Appendix at 159, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
 35. Id.; see also Kristen Waggoner, Supreme Court’s Same-Sex Wedding Cake Decision—A 
Significant Victory for Freedom, FOXNEWS.COM (June 4, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/ 
opinion/supreme-courts-same-sex-wedding-cake-decision-a-significant-victory-for-freedom. 
 36. Joint Appendix at 165, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
 37. Id. at 164. 
 38. Id. at 166–67. 
2019] Mastering Masterpiece 705 
C. Phillips’ Conscience is Put to the Test 
The test of Phillips’ conscience came in July 2012 (before Colorado 
recognized same-sex marriage), when Charlie Craig, David Mullins, and Craig’s 
mother visited Masterpiece Cakeshop.39  The two men were browsing a photo 
album of Phillips’ custom-design work40 when Phillips met them at his 
consultation table.41  But when they told Phillips that they wanted him to create 
a cake for their wedding, Phillips politely declined, explaining that he did not 
design wedding cakes for same-sex marriages, while emphasizing that he was 
happy to sell them anything in the store or make custom items for other 
occasions.42 
Soon the issue gained visibility in local and social media, with consequences 
including protests outside of the shop, boycotts of Masterpiece,43  and another 
cake artist crafting the men a wedding cake for free.44  The cake they said they 
planned to request from Phillips and ultimately had designed for their wedding 
reception was a multi-tiered, rainbow-layered wedding cake.45  Given the 
rainbow’s role as the preeminent gay pride symbol, Craig and Mullins’s wedding 
cake unequivocally celebrated same-sex marriage. 
D. The Legal Battle Begins: Compulsion Versus Conscience 
Craig and Mullins then filed charges with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, 
which enforces the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”),46 alleging 
that Phillips engaged in sexual-orientation discrimination.47  Shortly thereafter, 
the Division issued a probable-cause determination against Phillips,48 stating 
that there was a CADA violation.49  A formal complaint and administrative law 
                                            
 39. Id. at 168. 
 40. Id. at 89. 
 41. Id. at 168. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Kelsey Whipple, Masterpiece Cakeshop: Yelp Removes Negative Comments, while 
Supporters Create Facebook Group, WESTWORLD.COM (July 31, 2012), 
https://www.westword.com/restaurants/masterpiece-cakeshop-yelp-removes-negative-comments-
while-supporters-create-facebook-group-5746438. 
 44. Joint Appendix at 184–85, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
 45. Id. at 175–76. 
 46. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-34-601 (2014). 
 47. Joint Appendix at 47–52, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
 48. Id. at 69–86. 
 49. Id. at 69. 
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judge (“ALJ”) hearing ensued.50  Craig and Mullins intervened and the parties 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment.51  Phillips lost.52 
Phillips appealed the ALJ decision to the seven-member Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission—Commissioners who, at public meetings on the matter, 
broadcast their hostility toward Phillips’ faith.53 
One said that “Phillips can believe ‘what he wants to believe,’ but cannot act 
on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do business in the state.’”54  Another 
echoed, “[I]f a businessman wants to do business in the state and he’s got an 
issue with the—the law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to look 
at being able to compromise.”55  Yet another Commissioner said: 
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last 
meeting.  Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all 
kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, 
whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list 
hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to 
justify discrimination.  And to me it is one of the most despicable 
pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt 
others.56 
These statements were embedded in the record, as “[n]o commissioners objected 
to the comments.  Nor were they mentioned in the later state-court ruling or 
disavowed in the briefs filed here.”57 
The Commission subsequently ordered Phillips to design wedding cakes to 
celebrate same-sex marriages if he created cakes that celebrate opposite-sex 
marriages; to reeducate his staff on CADA; and to report quarterly to the 
Commission each of his artistic decisions to decline creating a cake.58  Phillips—
forced by the state to choose between his conscience or compelled performance 
of his art—had to stop designing wedding cakes.  The consequent 40 percent 
loss of business revenue led to him losing most of his employees, and the 
prospective brides and grooms in the community lost access to a well-regarded, 
sought-after cake artist.59 
                                            
 50. Id. at 87–100. 
 51. Id. at 102–48. 
 52. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 61a-91a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
 53. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1721.  As of this writing, the statements remain on record. 
 58. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 56a–58a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
 59. Blair Miller, Masterpiece Cakeshop Owner Says He’s Lost 40% of Business, Welcomes 
SCOTUS Hearing, THE DENVER CHANNEL (Jun. 26, 2017 12:25 PM), 
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E. Appeal to the Courts: Will Phillips’ Conscience be Protected? 
An appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals followed.60  Although that court 
recognized that Phillips declined Craig and Mullins’s request “‘because of’ [his] 
opposition to same-sex marriage, not because of [his] opposition to their sexual 
orientation,”61 it said that CADA requires no “showing of ‘animus’” against 
individuals62 and held that Phillips violated the statute.63  It rejected Phillips’ 
free-speech defense,64 saying that Phillips “does not convey a message 
supporting same-sex marriages merely by abiding by the law”65 because “a 
reasonable observer would understand that [his] compliance with the law is not 
a reflection of [his] own beliefs.”66 
The appellate court analyzed and rejected Phillips’ free-exercise arguments 
under Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith,67 which holds that incidental burdens on religious exercise from a facially 
neutral and generally applicable law need only satisfy the rational basis test, and 
affirmed the Commission’s decision on all counts.68  The Colorado Supreme 
Court declined review, but the United States Supreme Court granted Phillips’ 
petition for writ of certiorari on June 26, 2017.69 
F. Appeal to the United States Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court reversed the Colorado appellate court in a 7-2 opinion 
authored by Justice Kennedy—who earlier authored the opinion striking down 
the federal Defense of Marriage Act in United States v. Windsor70 and the 
opinion creating legal recognition of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. 
Hodges.71  Where Kennedy had recognized in Obergefell that many believed 
marriage to be “by its nature a gender-differentiated union of man and woman” 
                                            
https://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/politics/masterpiece-cakeshop-owner-says-hes-lost-40-
of-business-welcomes-scotus-hearing. 
 60. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 1a–53a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
 61. Id. at 12a–13a. 
 62. Id. at 18a. 
 63. Id. at 21a–22a. 
 64. Id. at 28a–36a. 
 65. Id. at 30a. 
 66. Id. at 31a. 
 67. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 68. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 1a–53a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
 69. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 
4, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-
rights-commn/. 
 70. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013). 
 71. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
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which belief “has been held—and continues to be held—in good faith by 
reasonable and sincere people here and throughout the world,”72 in Masterpiece 
I the Court employed the Free Exercise Clause to protect not only those beliefs 
about marriage, but the exercise of those beliefs.73 
G. Applying Lukumi: Religious Claimants are Entitled to a Hearing Untainted 
by Hostility 
Masterpiece I expanded on the principles found in Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, which had struck down a city ordinance that 
targeted religious animal sacrifices because that law was neither generally 
applicable nor neutral to religion.74  Applying Lukumi’s principles, the 
Masterpiece I Court held that, even if CADA were facially neutral and generally 
applicable, it was not applied neutrally, but rather with hostility toward religion.  
The Masterpiece I Court said that under Lukumi, “[f]actors relevant to the 
assessment of governmental neutrality include ‘the historical background of the 
decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment 
or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, 
including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking 
body.’”75  The state must be neutral toward religion76 and “even ‘subtle 
departures from neutrality’” violate the Constitution.77  Whether the law could 
force Phillips to design a custom cake in violation of his faith “needed to be 
determined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on the part of the State 
itself would not be a factor.”78 
The Commission failed that standard: The “attempt to account for the 
difference in treatment [contrasting Phillips’ case to three other cake artist cases] 
elevates one view of what is offensive over another and itself sends a signal of 
official disapproval of Phillips’ religious beliefs.”79  And the Constitution 
prohibits the state from acting “in a manner that passes judgment upon or 
presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices.”80 
                                            
 72. Id. at 2594. 
 73. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018). 
 74. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 527–28 (1993). 
 75. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1731 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540).  Notably, in Lukumi 
only Justices Kennedy and Stevens probed the legislative history of the offending ordinance to 
discern hostility, Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540–42 (plurality), while in Masterpiece I seven Justices 
examined these “factors relevant to the assessment of governmental neutrality.”  Masterpiece I ,138 
S. Ct. at 1722. 
 76. Id. at 1723–24. 
 77. Id. at 1731. 
 78. Id. at 1724. 
 79. Id. at 1731. 
 80. Id. 
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The Court also condemned the Commissioners’ hostile statements.  Declaring 
that the First Amendment protects religious beliefs rejecting same-sex 
marriage,81 the Court held that equating religious views to racism or the hatred 
which drove the holocaust is to “disparage . . . religion”; that deeming religious 
objections as “despicable . . . rhetoric” denigrates religion by characterizing 
one’s faith as “something insubstantial and even insincere,” and by leveling such 
language at Phillips, the Commission had abandoned the “responsibility of fair 
and neutral enforcement” the Constitution demands.82 
The Court’s forceful condemnation of the disparaging allusion to Jim Crow 
laws was well founded.  No rational connection exists between systematic, class-
based invidious racial discrimination and the conscientious affirmation of 
marriage between one man and one woman.  Racial discrimination is rooted in 
purported state interests of preserving “racial integrity” and “prevent[ing] ‘the 
corruption of blood’” to avoid creating ‘“a mongrel breed of citizens’” and 
endorsing the “doctrine of White Supremacy.”83  Racial discrimination 
“implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns”84 and is 
‘“odious in all aspects.’”85  Stopping systematic, class-based racial 
discrimination was a direct and intended outcome of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.86 
In contrast, affirming marriage as being a unique conjugal union between one 
man and one woman is not a class-based position: Phillips serves all people; 
racists do not.  Affirming marriage between a man and a woman is a view that 
“long has been held—and continues to be held—in good faith by reasonable and 
sincere people here and throughout the world.”87  And religious and 
philosophical objections to the contemporary government orthodoxy of same-
sex marriage are properly protected under the First Amendment.88 
H. The Commission’s Double Standard 
The lack of neutrality evidenced by the Commissioners’ verbal disparagement 
was sufficient in itself to invalidate their decision, as was the inconsistent 
application of CADA—particularly with respect to three cake artists who were 
                                            
 81. Id. at 1727. 
 82. Id. at 1729. 
 83. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (quoting Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 90 (1955)). 
 84. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017). 
 85. Id. at 868 (quoting Rose v Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)); see generally, Amicus 
Curiae Brief of Ryan T. Anderson, Ph.D., and African-American and Civil Rights Leaders in 
Support of Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 2017 WL 
4004529 *9–10 (U.S. 2017). 
 86. Loving, 388 U.S. at 9. 
 87. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015); see generally, Alvaré, supra note 31, 
at 349–51. 
 88. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
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allowed to decline a request to create cakes expressing a religiously motivated 
message opposing same-sex marriage.89 
This was a crucial point: where the Commission acted to suppress Mr. 
Phillips’ conscientious objection to using his art to celebrate same-sex marriage, 
it excused the three other bakers who conscientiously objected to the religious 
customer’s request to create cakes denigrating same-sex marriage.  The Court 
observed that “[a] principled rationale for the difference in treatment of these 
two instances cannot be based on the government’s own assessment of 
offensiveness” and pointed to Barnette’s prohibition of government 
orthodoxies.90  Justices Thomas and Gorsuch agreed, saying that if such 
disparate consideration were permitted, it “would allow the government to stamp 
out virtually any speech at will.”91  Justice Gorsuch further wrote that the two 
situations shared “all legally salient features,” noting that in both cases the cake 
artists “refused service intending only to honor a personal conviction,” knowing 
that “their conduct promised the effect of leaving  a customer in a protected class 
unserved.”92 
In both situations, the bakers “explained without contradiction that they would 
not sell the requested cakes to anyone, while they would sell other cakes to 
members of the protected class (as well as to anyone else).”93  For the three cake 
designers who refused to criticize same-sex marriage, the lower court heavily 
weighted their willingness to serve people of all faiths.94  But for Phillips, his 
willingness to serve customers of all sexual orientations was summarily 
dismissed as a “distinction without a difference.”95 
The Commission had tried to justify its disparate consideration by saying that 
the proposed denigrating cakes included images and text, while the celebrating 
cake did not and was thus less worthy of First Amendment protection.96  Justices 
Thomas and Alito responded: “To suggest that cakes with words convey a 
message but cakes without words do not—all in order to excuse the bakers in 
[the religious customer’s] case while penalizing Mr. Phillips—is irrational,” 
they said.97  The court continued, “[l]ike ‘an emblem or flag,’ a cake for a same-
                                            
 89. Id. at 1730–31. 
 90. Id. at 1731. 
 91. Id. at 1746 (Thomas, J., and Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 92. Id. at 1735 (Gorsuch, J., and Alito, J., concurring). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 1a–53a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
 95. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1736 (Thomas, J., and Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 96. Id. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J., and Alito, J., concurring). 
 97. Id. 
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sex wedding is a symbol that serves as ‘a short cut from mind to mind,’ 
signifying approval of a specific ‘system, idea, [or] institution.’”98 
Moreover, the appellate court regarded criticism of same-sex marriage as 
offensive, while refusing to recognize that support for same-sex marriage is also 
offensive to some.99  These inconsistencies revealed that the court had entered 
the forbidden ground of applying a government orthodoxy of what is “offensive” 
to justify regulating matters of speech and religion.100 
But there is more: the appellate court told Phillips (1) that his custom wedding 
cakes do not communicate anything, (2) that even if they did, the expression was 
not his but his clients, and (3) that no one would attribute meaning to his cakes 
beyond the fact that he was following CADA’s dictates.101  Yet the appellate 
court readily accepted that these cakes opposing same-sex marriage would 
communicate the bakers’ message (not just the client’s message) and that the 
three bakers could refuse to express a particular message.102 
The two Masterpiece I dissenters tried to excuse the disparate consideration 
by saying that Phillips “declined to make a cake he found offensive where the 
offensiveness of the product was determined solely by the identity of the 
customer requesting it.”103  But that ignores record evidence that Phillips would 
                                            
 98. Id. (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943)).  It is immaterial 
for constitutional purposes that Phillips writes, paints, and sculpts with edible materials like icing 
and fondant rather than ink and clay.  The court has even stated, ‘“the basic principles of freedom 
of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary’ when a new and 
different medium for communication appears.”  Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 
790 (2011) (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)). 
 99. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 20a n.8, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); Joint Appendix at 225–58, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111). 
 100. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763–64 (2017) (plurality opinion).  The Court in 
Matal struck down a federal trademark law prohibiting the registration of trademarks that 
disparaged persons or groups.  At issue was a music group’s attempt to trademark the name “The 
Slants,” a derogatory term referring to Asians that was intentionally chosen by the group to push 
back on cultural opprobrium directed at Asians.  Id. at 1754.  The Court expressly rejected the 
argument that the “Government has an interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that offend” 
because that would “strike[ ] at the heart of the First Amendment.”  Id. at 1764. 
 101. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 29a–31a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).  Justice Thomas responded directly to 
the “just following the law” defense, saying that that “argument would justify any law that 
compelled protected speech,” and relied on Barnette to say that the Court already rejected any 
analysis of compelled speech that ‘“would resolve every issue of power in favor of those in 
authority.’”  Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1744 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. 
at 636). 
 102. Appendix to Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari at 20a n.8, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 
(No. 16-111). 
 103. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1750 (Ginsburg, J., and Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  The 
dissenters disregarded the record evidence showing that Phillips would not sell such a cake to 
anyone because of the message—a point countered by Justice Gorsuch: “Mr. Phillips testified 
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not have designed a wedding cake celebrating same-sex marriage for anyone, 
regardless of their sexual orientation.104  The claim also reveals the grave 
inconsistency in judging such cases, where a person’s sexual conduct is 
presumed dispositive of status-based discrimination, while religious exercise is 
severed from status—even when exercising one’s faith is done despite the threat 
(and often, the reality) of state prosecution, catastrophic financial consequences, 
and community opprobrium. 
Justice Gorsuch directly addressed that point: “Nothing in the Commission’s 
opinions suggests any neutral principle to reconcile these holdings.  If Mr. 
Phillips’ objection is ‘inextricably tied’ to a protected class, then the bakers’ 
objection in [the religious customer’s] case must be ‘inextricably tied’ to one as 
well.”105  He further noted that “cakes celebrating same-sex weddings are 
(usually) requested by persons of a particular sexual orientation, so too are cakes 
expressing religious opposition to same-sex weddings (usually) requested by 
persons of particular religious faiths.”106  Thus, in “both cases the bakers’ 
objection would (usually) result in turning down customers who bear a protected 
characteristic.”107 
While the Masterpiece I court did not rule on Phillips’ free speech claims to 
protect his conscience, the Court observed that the case was “an instructive 
example . . . of the proposition that the application of constitutional freedoms in 
new contexts can deepen our understanding of their meaning.”108  And 
recognizing the expressive, communicative nature of custom wedding cakes will 
aid in applying free speech analysis in future cases—particularly under the 
compelled speech doctrine discussed infra. 
I. Masterpiece I: A Demand for Neutrality in Hearing Free Exercise Clause 
Claims 
Opponents of conscience rights have tried to cast Masterpiece I as a narrow 
decision that turned on strong evidence of religious hostility and disparate 
consideration.  This has led to some critics arguing that the case was little more 
than a matter of etiquette—had the Commission been more polite toward 
Phillips and the Commissioners kept their opinions to themselves, the apparent 
                                            
without contradiction that he would have refused to create a cake celebrating a same-sex marriage 
for any customer, regardless of his or her sexual orientation.  (“I will not design and create wedding 
cakes for a same-sex wedding regardless of the sexual orientation of the customer”).  And the record 
reveals that Mr. Phillips apparently refused just such a request from Mr. Craig’s mother.”  Id. at 
1735 (Gorsuch, J., and Alito, J., concurring). 
 104. Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 280 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015). 
 105. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1736 (Gorsuch, J., and Alito, J., concurring) 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1723. 
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hostility would have been cloaked and the decision would have survived.109  
Indeed, the Commission seemingly saw Masterpiece I as strictly limited to its 
facts, as evidenced by it advancing another discrimination claim against Phillips 
less than a month after losing Masterpiece I—this time after Phillips declined to 
create a custom cake celebrating a “gender transition” from male to female.110 
This continued antagonism is startling, as the 7-2 Masterpiece I decision 
pointedly said that religious objectors are “entitled to a neutral decisionmaker 
who [will] give full and fair consideration to his religious objection as he [seeks] 
to assert it in all of the circumstances in which this case [is] presented, 
considered, and decided.”111  Thus, neither verbal disparagement nor disparate 
consideration of religion are permitted when a Free Exercise Clause claim is 
considered. 
But even if government actors manage to refrain from disparaging religion 
and use a plausibly even-handed treatment process so as to avoid Masterpiece I, 
attempting to coerce creative professionals to create runs squarely into the 
compelled speech doctrine as discussed in Section III, infra. 
Despite Masterpiece I and the compelled speech doctrine, the printer toner 
was barely dry on the Masterpiece I opinion when Masterpiece II arose.  And 
Masterpiece II illustrates that the Commission remains focused on suppressing 
Phillips’ religion and his speech. 
J. The Commission Unrepentant: Masterpiece II 
The same day that the Supreme Court granted review in Masterpiece I, 
Masterpiece II was conceived: A transgender lawyer telephoned Mr. Phillips to 
order a cake that would be blue on the outside and pink on the inside, which the 
lawyer said would celebrate the lawyer’s gender transition from a man to a 
woman.112  Months later, the lawyer called again, this time asking Phillips to 
create a “birthday” cake for Satan.113  Phillips declined both requests because 
the message sought was contrary to his religious convictions.114  Such “testing” 
requests were coming with disturbing frequency to Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
                                            
 109. See generally Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 Harv. 
L. Rev. 133 (2018). 
 110. Id. at 149; see also James Anderson, Colorado baker: No cake for gender transition 
celebration, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Aug. 15, 2018), https://apnews.com/ 
f561dd94839744cca86996cfef508e83; Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, No. 18-cv-02074 (D. 
Colo. Oct. 23, 2018). 
 111. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. at 1732. 
 112. Order Den. Mot. to Dismiss, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, No. 18-cv-02074 (D. 
Colo. Jan. 4, 2019) (ECF No. 94). 
 113. Am. Compl. at 3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, No. 18-cv-02074 (D. Colo. Oct. 
23, 2018) (ECF No. 51).  The call was received from the lawyer’s cellphone, from which Phillips 
believes the caller, who did not identify himself, was the lawyer.  Id. 
 114. Id. 
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including other requests for Satan-honoring cakes (one to be adorned with a 
working sex toy, another would be decorated with the satanic pentagram 
symbol).115  But Phillips consistently declined to communicate messages that 
violated his conscience. 
Predictably, the lawyer filed a CADA complaint against Phillips for declining 
to create the gender transition cake, and the Division again found “probable 
cause” that Phillips violated CADA by discriminating against the lawyer’s 
transgender status, which is protected with CADA’s definition of sexual 
orientation.116  At this juncture, Phillips had little choice but to go to federal 
court to resist the Commission’s persistent and ongoing hostility to his faith. 
Unsurprisingly, the Commission moved to dismiss the federal case and took 
the position that it should be able to prosecute Phillips with a free hand, saying 
that Younger v. Harris117  compelled the federal court to abstain lest it interfere 
with an ongoing state proceeding which implicated important state interests.118 
But the court refused to abstain.  Even assuming that the predicates for non-
discretionary Younger abstention existed, there was an “extraordinary 
circumstance” in that the Commission was advancing its charges in bad faith.119  
The court pointed out that Phillips had declined the blue and pink cake 
specifically “‘because of the messages that the cake would have expressed,’ and 
not because of [the lawyer’s claimed] transgender status.”120  This demonstrated 
bad faith because the Commission had “permitted . . . three bakeries to refuse to 
provide custom cakes to a customer because of the bakers’ beliefs that the 
proposed cake messages were ‘derogatory,’ ‘hateful,’ and ‘discriminatory,’ 
while the Commission denied the same accommodation to Phillips” when he 
declined to create a cake conveying a given message.121 
The failure to treat message-based conscientious objection consistently 
among the artists was “especially glaring because Masterpiece I denounced the 
Division’s and the Commission’s unequal treatment of Phillips just before the 
Division and the Commission began new proceedings against Phillips.”122  In 
                                            
 115. Id. at 4. 
 116. Order Den. Mot. to Dismiss at 13, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, No. 18-cv-02074 
(D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2019) (ECF No. 94).  Colorado law includes transgender status within its definition 
of “sexual orientation.”  Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-34-301 (2014). 
 117. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). 
 118. State Officials’ Rule 12(b)(1) Mot. to Dismiss at 10–13, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. 
Elenis, No. 18-cv-02074 (D. Colo. Oct. 10, 2018) (ECF No. 43). 
 119. Order Den. Mot. to Dismiss at 18, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, No. 18-cv-02074 
(D. Colo. Jan 4, 2019) (ECF No. 94). 
 120. Id. at 19. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 22. 
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light of this bad faith, the federal court declined to abstain and denied the motion 
to dismiss.123 
As the above sequence of events shows, Colorado is again acting 
“inconsistent[ly] with the First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied 
in a manner that is neutral toward religion.”124  Yet the Free Exercise Clause is 
but the first protection for the right of people to live consistent with their faith.  
A second layer of protection is found in the Free Speech Clause, particularly 
under the compelled speech doctrine—a doctrine which has protected free 
speech from being silenced by forces ranging from extraordinary societal 
pressures to overbearing applications of public accommodation laws. 
III. THE COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE GUARDS FREE SPEECH AGAINST 
OVERT AND COVERT GOVERNMENT COMPULSION 
Creative professional cases squarely raise compelled speech issues, and the 
constraints of the compelled speech doctrine apply regardless of whether the 
government acted with the required constitutional neutrality in considering a 
religious conscience claim.  And the compelled speech doctrine protects free 
speech that is being suppressed by misuse of public accommodation laws, as 
established over twenty years ago in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and 
Bisexual Group of Boston.125 
In Hurley, the Court held that parade organizers could not be compelled to 
include a contingent marching under a banner that said “Irish American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.”126  The organizers had no objection to 
gays, lesbians, or bisexuals marching in their parade individually, but did object 
to communicating a message that they did not want to convey through their 
parade.127 
Hurley established that the state cannot use public-accommodation laws to 
force individuals to convey a message they disagree with.  This is specifically 
applied to the context where the speakers—(the parade organizers in Hurley)—
rejected an access request of someone based on the message to be 
communicated, not on the requestor’s protected characteristics. 
Notably, Hurley made clear that the compelled speech doctrine applies to the 
commercial marketplace: “the fundamental rule . . . that a speaker has the 
autonomy to choose the content of his own message” is “enjoyed by business 
                                            
 123. Id. at 52–53. 
 124. Masterpiece I, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018). 
 125. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 581 
(1995); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656–59 (2000) (rejecting compelled 
association where individual’s views clashed with moral views of organization). 
 126. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570. 
 127. Id. at 572. 
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corporations generally,”128 including for-profit speakers that collaborate with 
others on the “items[s] featured in the[ir] communication[s].”129  As the Court 
explained, the compelled speech doctrine applied because the state used the 
statute “in a peculiar way,” “produc[ing] an order essentially requiring [a group] 
to alter the expressive content” of its speech.130 
The compelled speech doctrine “protects the right of individuals to hold a 
point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster . . . an idea they 
find morally objectionable.”131  It forbids the government from forcing citizens 
(or businesses) to express messages to which they object, and from punishing 
them for declining to convey such messages.132  And that prohibition applies 
when public accommodation laws are used to deny creative professionals their 
right “to choose the content of [their] own message,”133 and decide “what merits 
celebration,”134 even if the state or some individuals deem those choices 
“misguided, or even hurtful.”135 
A. NIFLA: Applying the Compelled Speech Doctrine Today 
Two 2018 cases, NIFLA v. Becerra136 and Janus v. AFSCME137 help illustrate 
how the compelled speech doctrine would serve to protect creative professionals 
against government-compelled speech.  In NIFLA, the Court considered 
California’s regulation of pregnancy care centers that support and encourage 
pregnant women to carry their babies to term, reflecting the centers’ religious 
objection to abortion.138  Under the law, licensed pregnancy care centers were 
obligated to provide information about state-subsidized abortion, while 
unlicensed pregnancy care centers were required to disclose their unlicensed 
status.139 
The Court held that the licensed facility regulation was content-based, which 
typically triggers strict scrutiny—although in this instance the Court held that it 
                                            
 128. Id. at 573–74. 
 129. Id. at 570. 
 130. Id. at 572–73. 
 131. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). 
 132. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795–801 (1988) 
(forbidding the state from requiring paid commercial fundraisers to disclose the percentage of 
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party’s expression in its billing envelope); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 
254–58 (1974) (forbidding the state from requiring a newspaper to publish a third party’s article). 
 133. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573. 
 134. Id. at 574. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 137. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 138. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2371. 
 139. Id. at 2368. 
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even failed intermediate scrutiny.140  And it struck down the unlicensed facility 
regulation without deciding the relevant standard because the regulation could 
not even satisfy the more deferential test in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,141 noting that it was “not sufficiently drawn” 
to meet the asserted state interest of informing low-income women about 
abortion.142 
NIFLA points out that a law is not content-neutral if it “compel[s] individuals 
to speak a particular message” and therefore “alte[rs] the content” of someone’s 
speech.143  That is just what public accommodation laws force creative 
professionals to do: “alter the content” of speech by compelling them to speak a 
message they disagree with (thus violating their consciences) as did the 
Commission in ordering Phillips to create cakes celebrating same-sex weddings 
if he created cakes celebrating biblical marriage. 
NIFLA further informs the issues surrounding creative professionals and their 
rights of conscience.  When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to 
diminish the First Amendment protections for licensed professionals and thereby 
favor pro-abortion speech, it was met with a sharp rebuke from the Supreme 
Court: “[W]hen the government polices the content of professional speech, it 
can fail to ‘preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will 
ultimately prevail.’”144  The Court continued: 
Professionals might have a host of good-faith disagreements, both 
with each other and with the government, on many topics in their 
respective fields.  Doctors and nurses might disagree about the ethics 
of assisted suicide or the benefits of medical marijuana; lawyers and 
marriage counselors might disagree about the prudence of prenuptial 
agreements or the wisdom of divorce; bankers and accountants might 
disagree about the amount of money that should be devoted to savings 
or the benefits of tax reform.  “[T]he best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,” 
and the people lose when the government is the one deciding which 
ideas should prevail.145 
                                            
 140. Id. at 2371.  The court found that the  “licensed notice is a content-based regulation of 
speech,” and that as “a general matter, such laws ‘are presumptively unconstitutional and may be 
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interests.’”  Id. (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)). 
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(1985). 
 142. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2375. 
 143. Id. at 2371 (internal quotations omitted).  See also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 
& Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 572–73 (1995) (including unwanted message altered 
content of parade organizers’ speech). 
 144. Id. at 2374 (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014)). 
 145. Id. at 2374–75 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the Court is “reluctant to mark off new categories of speech for diminished 
constitutional protection” and “especially reluctant to ‘exemp[t] a category of 
speech from the normal prohibition on content-based restrictions.’”146  As 
Justice Kennedy recognized, it is a “serious threat” when the state “compels 
individuals to contradict their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic 
philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts, or all of these.”147 
B. Janus: The Added Injury of Compelling Speech 
In Janus, the Court held that Illinois’ collection of agency fees for unions from 
nonmember public employees was unconstitutional.148  As the Court put it, 
“[w]e simply draw the line at allowing the government to . . . require all 
employees to support the union irrespective of whether they share its views.”149  
Janus draws a wide boundary around the compelled speech doctrine: the agency 
fees paid by nonmembers were limited to costs for collective bargaining efforts 
and other nonpolitical work by the union, and not for the union’s political 
advocacy.150  Moreover, agency fees raised a question of subsidy, and not 
directly compelling speech or association.  Yet this was nonetheless 
problematic.151  The Court found, “[c]ompelling individuals to mouth support 
for views they find objectionable violates that cardinal constitutional command, 
and in most contexts, any such effort would be universally condemned.”152 
In contrast, “Free speech serves many ends.  It is essential to our democratic 
form of government, and it furthers the search for truth.”153  The consequences 
of governmental restriction of free speech are perilous, for “[w]henever the 
Federal Government or a State prevents individuals from saying what they think 
on important matters or compels them to voice ideas with which they disagree, 
it undermines these ends.”154  Worse, “additional damage is done” when speech 
is compelled because “individuals are coerced into betraying their 
convictions.”155  And “[f]orcing free and independent individuals to endorse 
                                            
 146. Id. at 2372. 
 147. Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 148. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 
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ideas they find objectionable” requires “even more immediate and urgent 
grounds than a law demanding silence.”156 
Bringing this back to the matter at hand, the parallel with the Masterpiece 
cases and Janus is striking.  One could argue that no one forced Jack Phillips to 
become a cake artist.  But it is also unlikely that the municipal workers were 
forced to their labors by press gangs.  And of course, there are valid 
governmental interests in access to public accommodations and in maintaining 
functional labor relations among unions, management, and workers. 
But as Hurley held, applying public accommodation laws in peculiar ways to 
coerce speech is unconstitutional: there is no valid state interest to justify the 
“additional injury” of individuals being forced to speak against their 
conscientious convictions, be they a bureaucrat or a baker—especially when 
Janus condemned subsidizing unwanted speech, while in the creative 
professional cases they are being compelled to use their own artistic talent to 
create their own speech.157 
Perhaps the case is coming where some wayward state agency, bent on putting 
its finger on one side of some controversy, manages to guard its tongue, avoid 
email and paper trails, disguise unequal application of the law to similar 
conscientious objectors, and closely cabin its covert hostility toward religion, 
such that it appears neutral to the outside world while it slyly seeks to compel 
an American farmer, florist, printer, doctor, painter or filmmaker to speak 
against their conscience.  But when that happens, the compelled speech doctrine 
provides a sound bulwark against such an attack. 
IV. MASTERPIECE I, NIFLA, AND JANUS ARE WELL TIMED TO AID THE 
CREATIVE PROFESSIONALS CURRENTLY LITIGATING TO DEFEND THEIR 
CONSCIENCES 
While Colorado has become a hotbed of religious hostility, similar state 
hostility and disparate consideration have been exposed throughout the United 
States, as exemplified in Telescope Media, Brush and Nib and Buck v. Gordon. 
A. Telescope Media 
These three Supreme Court cases are already reinvigorating freedom of 
conscience jurisprudence in the lower courts.  In Telescope Media Group v. 
Lucero,158 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed in 
part the district court’s dismissal of a First Amendment challenge to the 
Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) brought by filmmakers Carl and 
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Angel Larsen:159  “Carl and Angel Larsen wish to make wedding videos.  Can 
Minnesota require them to produce videos of same-sex weddings, even if the 
message would conflict with their own beliefs?  The district court concluded that 
it could and dismissed the Larsens’ constitutional challenge to Minnesota’s 
antidiscrimination law.”160 
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota rejected a First 
Amendment challenge to the Minnesota Human Rights Act brought by 
filmmakers Carl and Angel Larsen.161  As Christians, the Larsens place Christ at 
the center of their lives.  And much like Phillips’ reasoned selection of 
“Masterpiece” as his Cakeshop’s name, the Larsens chose “Telescope Media” 
because they sought to magnify God and our culture’s understanding of God 
through their filmmaking.162  Their films tell a story about their clients, helping 
author and shape the story’s plot and narrative; selecting just the right location 
and spending long hours to edit the film to maximize its message and to honor 
God.163 
And like Phillips and Stutzman, the Larsens work with anyone, but cannot 
communicate all messages.  The Larsens want to and would bring their talents 
to market, working with betrothed men and women to promote their religious 
beliefs about marriage.164  But Minnesota officials gave them a choice: if you 
deliver your message about marriage through commissioned wedding films, you 
must also deliver the government’s contrary message through your 
commissioned wedding films.  Fail to do so, and you risk criminal penalties 
including steep fines and even jail time.165  Given that reality, the Larsens have 
forgone expressing their views on marriage through their filmmaking.166 
Ironically, if the Larsens had been pro-gay filmmakers seeking to influence 
the culture on same-sex marriage in the years before Obergefell, no law would 
have compelled them to present only the government’s message affirming man-
woman marriage.  But today the Minnesota Human Rights Act compels a 
filmmaker seeking to influence the culture on a view of marriage held by 
millions, grounded in over 2,000 years of history, and held by all of the 
Abrahamic faiths to present the contrary message affirming same-sex marriage. 
Although the Larsens raised a First Amendment compelled speech claim, the 
district court rejected it, finding that Minnesota may force them to produce films 
celebrating same-sex weddings if they do any work celebrating biblical 
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weddings.167  The district court even affirmed differential treatment of decisions 
to decline service: decisions grounded in secular “legitimate business 
purpose[s]” are permissible,168 but a conscientious objection grounded in 
religious belief in marriage between a man and a woman is not.  Thus, in 
Minnesota some creative professionals could decline work if they opposed the 
requested message, while professionals relying upon religious motivations 
would be subject to the penalties.  Masterpiece I forbids such a result.169 
The Eighth Circuit had no difficulty seeing that “videos are a form of speech 
that is entitled to First Amendment protection” and “a significant medium for 
the communication of ideas.”170  The court cited to Masterpiece I to say that the 
commercial context of the videos was irrelevant to the First Amendment 
inquiry.171  And the court readily rejected Minnesota’s defense that it only 
regulated the conduct of producing the videos, pointing out that such a position 
would justify censoring painting by regulating the conduct of moving a paint 
brush, or the contents of a newspaper by regulating the conduct of setting 
print.172 
Applying the MHRA to the Larsens’ video production violated their free 
speech in two ways: it compelled them to speak favorably on a topic (same-sex 
marriage) that they did not wish to speak about, and it operated as a 
presumptively unconstitutional content-based regulation.173  Both are “at odds 
with the ‘cardinal constitutional command’ against compelled speech.”174  Just 
because the Larsens “wish to actively promote opposite-sex weddings through 
their videos,” Minnesota “cannot ‘coerce[ them] into betraying their 
convictions’” or to promote ‘“ideas they find objectionable,’” which “is always 
demeaning.”175  The MHRA operated as a content-based regulation in the 
Larsens’ case, even though it did not facially address speech.176  A regulation is 
content-based when it mandates speech “that a speaker would not otherwise 
make” or “exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of speech.”177  Minnesota 
crossed both these lines, which subjected the MHRA to strict scrutiny.178 
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Minnesota asserted a compelling state interest in ending “sexual-orientation 
discrimination.”179  But that did not save the state, said the Court, because 
“[e]ven antidiscrimination laws, as critically important as they are, must yield to 
the Constitution.”180  While the state is free to regulate conduct, it “is not free to 
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message 
or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike 
the government.”181  Put simply, “regulating speech because it is discriminatory 
or offensive is not a compelling state interest,” even if the speech may be 
“hurtful.”182 
The Eighth Circuit also held that the Larsens’ religious freedom claim could 
proceed based on hybrid rights theory, defined in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith183 as the Free Exercise 
Clause operating “in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as 
freedom of speech.”184  Because the Larsens’ speech was an exercise of their 
faith, the court invoked the hybrid-rights doctrine and applied strict scrutiny.185 
In sum, the Eighth Circuit drew from NIFLA, Janus, Masterpiece I, and their 
antecedents to shield against an attempt to use a public accommodation law to 
compel speech.  Such laws may regulate conduct, but if they are peculiarly 
applied to regulate speech, their reach is limited by the First Amendment.  The 
Supreme Court stated, ‘“[t]here is no room under our Constitution for a more 
restrictive’ approach because ‘the alternative would lead to standardization of 
ideas . . . by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.’”186 
B. Brush and Nib 
Barely three weeks after Telescope Media was decided, the Arizona Supreme 
Court decided Brush and Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix.187  In Phoenix, 
Arizona two Christian artists—a painter and a calligrapher—are being coerced 
to produce art—wedding vows, wedding invitations, and wedding signs—
celebrating same-sex weddings.188  The artists—Joanna Duka and Breanna 
Koski—challenged the ordinance under article 2, section 6 free speech provision 
of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona’s Free Exercise of Religion Act 
(“FERA”), A.R.S. § 41-1493.01.  The state supreme court explained: 
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The rights of free speech and free exercise, so precious to this nation 
since its founding, are not limited to soft murmurings behind the doors 
of a person’s home or church, or private conversations with like–
minded friends and family.  These guarantees protect the right of every 
American to express their beliefs in public.  This includes the right to 
create and sell words, paintings, and art that express a person’s sincere 
religious beliefs.189 
This holds true even where the artists’ “beliefs about same-sex marriage may 
seem old fashioned, or even offensive to some.”190  “[T]he guarantees of free 
speech and freedom of religion are not only for those who are deemed 
sufficiently enlightened, advanced, or progressive.  They are for everyone.”191  
Then, citing to Barnette, the court said that this “freedom to differ is not limited 
to things that do not matter much . . . [t]he test of its substance is the right to 
differ as to the things that touch the heart of the existing order.”192 
Duka and Koski are Christians who will not create “custom artwork that 
communicates ideas or messages . . . that contradict biblical truth, demean 
others, endorse racism, incite violence, or promote any marriage besides 
marriage between one man and one woman.” 193  It is their belief that “only a 
man and a woman can be joined in marriage.”194  To be sure, “they will create 
custom artwork for, and sell pre-made artwork to, any customers regardless of 
their sexual orientation,” but they cannot convey a message celebrating a 
marriage other than between one man and one woman.195 
The city argued that its law merely regulated conduct and that only 
intermediate scrutiny applied, but the court squarely rejected that argument: 
“Pure speech includes written and spoken words, as well as other media such as 
paintings, music, and film ‘that predominantly serve to express thoughts, 
emotions, or ideas.’”196  Because the custom invitations created by Duka and 
Koski contained hand-drawn words, images, and calligraphy, the court found 
that they were “pure speech,” and that the effort to compel them merited strict 
scrutiny.197 
Although Arizona’s constitutional free speech protection offers a broader 
shield than the First Amendment does, the court relied on long-settled federal 
First Amendment jurisprudence to “conclusively resolve[] Plaintiffs’ claim” 
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under the compelled speech doctrine.198  As the court pointed out, 
“‘[c]ompelling individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable 
violates’ the ‘cardinal constitutional command’ that individuals have autonomy 
over their speech.”199  And when the “State prevents individuals from saying 
what they think on important matters or compels them to voice ideas with which 
they disagree, it undermines” the whole point of free speech protection and “is 
always demeaning.”200 
Nonetheless, the city (just like Colorado in Masterpiece I and Minnesota in 
Telescope Media) argued that declining to provide custom services to celebrate 
same-sex marriage was merely a proxy for status-based discrimination.  Not so, 
the court said: “The fact that Plaintiffs’ message-based refusal primarily impacts 
customers with certain sexual orientations does not deprive Plaintiffs of First 
Amendment protection.”201  That standard was set long ago in Hurley.202  
Because the artists acted based on message, not status, they were entitled to 
constitutional protection.203 
All this brought strict scrutiny to bear on the city’s ordinance, against which 
the city argued that eliminating discrimination was a compelling state interest.  
But in Hurley, “the Supreme Court rejected any suggestion that a public 
accommodations law could justify compelling speech.”204  Simply put, the 
government may not declare another’s speech itself to be a public 
accommodation or grant “protected individuals . . . the right to participate in 
[another’s] speech.”205 
The court also considered the religious freedom claim, noting that Duka and 
Koski sought to “freely exercise their religion by expressing messages that are 
consistent with their faith, as well as refusing to express messages that are 
inconsistent with their faith.”206  The claim was brought under Arizona’s FERA, 
which is a statute that resurrected pre-Smith strict scrutiny analysis for religious 
freedom claims. 
The court began its FERA analysis by holding that the ordinance imposed a 
substantial burden on the artists’ exercise of their faith.  “[T]he coercion the 
Ordinance places on Plaintiffs to abandon their religious belief is unmistakable,” 
said the Court.207  There was virtually no option given, “[o]n one hand, they can 
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choose to forsake their religious convictions and create wedding invitations 
celebrating same-sex marriage.”208  But on the other hand, if they stay true to 
their faith, the city could order each of them to jail for six months for “every day 
Duka and Koski [violate] the Ordinance.”209  Even if they avoided jail, they 
faced “a possible fine of $2,500,” and “for a continuing violation, the fine could 
be tens of thousands of dollars.”210  If that were not enough for a substantial 
burden, the city had “authority under the Ordinance’s nuisance provision to 
simply shut down Duka and Koski’s business altogether.”211 
The court brushed aside the City’s argument that protecting the artists’ 
religious freedom would enable other businesses to discriminate at will using 
the guise of religion.212  These “slippery slope” arguments were properly 
rejected in Hobby Lobby, and such speculative arguments carry no weight.213 
Far more important was the fact that “like the religious organizations exempt 
under the Ordinance, Brush & Nib was established, and is operated, to promote 
certain religious principles.  Although Plaintiffs operate Brush & Nib for profit, 
this does not mean that they cannot, like a religious organization or church, also 
further their ‘religious objectives as well.’”214  It made no difference that the 
expression was created for profit, as FERA does not distinguish between non-
profit and for-profit entities.215 
At bottom, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that “[f]reedom of speech 
and religion requires tolerance of different beliefs and points of view.”216  Such 
“tolerance of another’s beliefs and point of view is indispensable to the survival 
and growth of our democracy.”217  When the court enforces and protects these 
rights, it “preserves ‘individual freedom of mind in preference to officially 
disciplined uniformity for which history indicates a disappointing and disastrous 
end.’”218  The state may freely “promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful 
behavior,” said the court, but “it is not free to interfere with speech for no better 
reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, 
however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.”219  With that, 
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the court held that the creation and sale of custom wedding invitations by Brush 
& Nib’s artists was beyond the reach of the city ordinance.220 
C. Buck v. Gordon 
Shortly after the Brush & Nib decision, a federal district court in Michigan 
upheld the right of a faith-based adoption and foster placement agency to 
“continue to do th[at] work and still profess and promote the traditional Catholic 
belief that marriage as ordained by God is for one man and one woman.”221  The 
state of Michigan contracted with religious and non-religious agencies to serve 
approximately 13,000 children in the foster and adoption system.222  All eligible 
children were tracked in a state-maintained database, and the agencies used that 
database to place eligible children with adoptive or foster parents who have been 
licensed by the state.223  The state contracted with agencies to evaluate and 
certify prospective parents as eligible to adopt or foster a child, but an agency 
could decline any such assignment, and it would be passed on to another 
provider.224 
St. Vincent Charities contracted with the state and would place children with 
same-sex couples certified by other agencies: its sole religious objection was to 
accepting referrals to evaluate and certify same-sex or unmarried couples as 
prospective parents.225  All agencies were allowed to decline a referral, so long 
as they responded promptly.226 
In 2015, Michigan passed a law to ensure that religious agencies could serve 
without yielding their religious beliefs, and the state initially defended the law 
against an ACLU lawsuit intended to strike the statute down and drive out 
agencies like St. Vincent’s.227  But in 2018, a newly elected state attorney 
general reversed the state’s position and settled the lawsuit, agreeing to force 
religious organizations to certify same-sex couples in violation of their religious 
scruples.228  And the Attorney General was openly hostile toward religious 
agencies, saying that the “only purpose” of the 2015 law was “discriminatory 
animus” and labeling those who supported the law (including St. Vincent’s) as 
“‘hate mongers’ who disliked gay people more than they cared about 
children.”229 
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St. Vincent’s and others brought suit to challenge the settlement agreement, 
prevailing when the court applied strict scrutiny under Lukumi because there was 
ample evidence of “religious targeting,” including the Attorney General making 
the 2015 law a campaign issue, insisting that the law only furthered 
“discriminatory animus” and labeling St. Vincent’s religious beliefs as “hate.”230 
That brings us back to Masterpiece I.  The Attorney General asked to be 
dismissed from the case because she was “simply the State’s chief legal counsel, 
[and] is not responsible for Michigan’s change in policy.”231  But the court 
refused, saying that the Attorney General was “at the very heart of the case” and 
that her rhetoric of hate and discriminatory animus raised “a strong inference of 
a hostility toward a religious viewpoint.”232  In particular, the Attorney General’s 
pivotal role in moving the state from defending to attacking St. Vincent’s faith-
based objection was strong evidence that she targeted St. Vincent because of “its 
religious belief.”233 
As the court summarized the case, St. Vincent’s placed children as required 
by the state contracts, including with same-sex couples who were certified by 
other agencies.234  But “[w]hat St. Vincent has not done and will not do is give 
up its traditional Catholic belief that marriage as instituted by God is for one 
man and one woman,” and thus it could not certify same-sex or unmarried 
couples as eligible to adopt or foster.235  The state’s hostility toward that act of 
religious conscience required strict scrutiny, and the district court issued a 
preliminary injunction to prevent the state from coercing St. Vincent to act 
against its faith.236 
St. Vincent is not alone in dealing with these issues, as another case is gaining 
national attention because Washington state officials are disregarding the 
Supreme Court’s recent guidance on religious neutrality and compelled speech. 
V. WASHINGTON V. ARLENE’S FLOWERS: THE FLOWERING OF RELIGIOUS 
CONSCIENCE 
In Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers,237 florist and shop owner Barronelle 
Stutzman had served a gay customer, Robert Ingersoll, for nine years, helping 
him celebrate myriad occasions.  But when Robert sought Ms. Stutzman’s 
talents to custom design arrangements to celebrate his wedding, she gently 
explained that she could not help celebrate his wedding “because of her 
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relationship with Jesus Christ,” and referred him to other florists in whose skills 
she had confidence.238 
The Washington Attorney General, after learning about Ms. Stutzman’s 
religious conflict through media reports (and absent any complaint from Mr. 
Ingersoll) sent a legal demand letter threatening to sue Ms. Stutzman, employed 
a heretofore unknown theory to bring a state consumer protection act against 
her, and sued Ms. Stutzman in her personal and corporate capacities.239  Not long 
after, Ingersoll also brought suit, represented by the ACLU.240 
The case worked its way to the Supreme Court of Washington, which affirmed 
the lower courts’ opinion that Stutzman had discriminated on the basis of sexual 
orientation and upheld the judgment against her in her personal capacity for 
damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.241  Stutzman then appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court, which shortly after deciding Masterpiece I granted 
certiorari, vacated the state court ruling, and remanded the case for 
consideration in light of Masterpiece I.  On remand, the Washington Supreme 
Court excused the Attorney General’s overt hostility toward Stutzman’s 
religious beliefs by cabining Masterpiece I to forbid only hostility by 
“adjudicatory bodies.”242  Having sidestepped the neutrality requirements, it said 
that Janus and NIFLA were “outside the scope of the remand” and thus irrelevant 
to the analysis because they did not specifically address the application of public 
accommodation statutes.243  Washington’s highest court then reinstated much of 
its prior opinion almost verbatim.244 
Like the Colorado Commissioners, Washington officials have disparaged Ms. 
Stutzman’s faith, with the Attorney General also employing the odious race 
analogy to demean Ms. Stutzman, saying that “[w]e can’t go back to the 1960s 
and lunch counters.”245  He openly attacked Ms. Stutzman’s faith in his briefing, 
scoffing that some who share her “Southern Baptist faith for decades offered a 
purportedly ‘reasoned religious distinction’ for race discrimination.”246  And 
Washington delved into disparate consideration, initiating aggressive, novel 
litigation against Stutzman by suing in her personal and corporate capacities—
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yet all but ignoring an astounding instance of anti-Christian discrimination in 
Seattle’s aptly named Bedlam Coffee store. 
There, the gay coffee shop owner profanely attacked a group of Christian 
customers in October 2017.  After learning that the customers had distributed 
flyers advocating their religious views on life on nearby public areas, Bedlam’s 
owner denied them service, repeatedly ordered them to “shut up,” and angrily 
yelled: “Leave, all of you! Tell all your f—-ing friends, ‘Don’t f—-ing come 
here!’”247  And the owner profanely expressed a desire to engage in homosexual 
behavior with his partner in public, and with Jesus Christ.248  The official 
response? Unlike the Attorney General’s aggressive legal attack on Ms. 
Stutzman, the Commission sent only an “educational” letter which carried no 
legal weight to Bedlam’s owner, and to which he did not respond.249 
Washington further mirrored Colorado’s errors: where in Masterpiece I a 
Commissioner said that Phillips could “believe ‘what he wants to believe,’ but 
cannot act on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do business in the state,’”250 
in Arlene’s Flowers the Attorney General said that “Ms. Stutzman is free to hold 
her religious beliefs about marriage, but she is not entitled to invoke them” in 
running her business.251  And he explained that he sued Ms. Stutzman in her 
personal capacity because she made decisions for her business based on “her 
personal belief ‘that marriage is a union of a man and a woman.’”252  This sends 
a chilling message to creative professionals acting on their own religious beliefs: 
living out their faith in the marketplace may lead to professional hardship and 
personal financial ruin. 
On September 11, 2019, Ms. Stutzman again petitioned the United States 
Supreme Court to hear her case, pointing out that the Washington Supreme 
Court’s holding that her custom wedding designs are not artistic expression is 
unsupportable.  The state court disregarded Hurley’s admonition that 
governments cannot use public accommodation laws to compel speech.  And it 
spurned the Supreme Court’s admonition that government officials must act 
neutrally toward religion.  As Buck illustrated, that applies to a state attorney 
general, not just appointed commissioners sitting on “adjudicatory bodies.” 
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Stutzman’s wedding art is protected First Amendment expression.  Floral 
design as an art form is documented in antiquity, and modern universities 
continue to teach “the art of floral design.”253  The components of floral art are 
all but indistinguishable from painting: a florist must choose and display shape, 
shade, geometry, and color.254  Stutzman deploys these principles to “express[], 
in abstract form, her vision of the couple’s unique personalities, style, and what 
they want their ceremony to be.”255  The Washington Supreme Court’s failure 
to recognize this as speech not only conflicts with numerous cases that followed 
Hurley’s admonition that “the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken 
words as mediums of expression,”256 but leads to absurdity: Van Gogh’s “Vase 
with Red Poppies,” depicting a few poppies in pottery, would enjoy First 
Amendment protection while Stutzman’s far more intricate, artistic celebration 
of a wedding with actual flowers would not.257 
The facts of Arlene’s Flowers invite analysis under both the religious 
neutrality doctrine and compelled speech principles.  It would be a grave 
injustice to allow this case to end with a different outcome than the courts have 
reached in Masterpiece I, NIFLA, Janus, Telescope Media, and Brush & Nib. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This is scarcely an exhaustive list of such cases but illustrates the breadth and 
depth of the chill.  Given that the “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even 
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury,”258 these 
cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court must be vigilant to enforce long-
established constitutional obligations so that creative professionals having 
religious objections to some messages or events are treated equally, have their 
faith respected through a truly neutral hearing process, and not be compelled to 
speak or create expression contrary to their beliefs. 
The core of the question is conscience, and conscience cuts a broad swath 
through our culture.  The next case may be a Democrat cake artist declining to 
create a cake for President Trump’s second inauguration because he created such 
a cake for President Obama;259 a Mormon filmmaker declining to do a 
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promotional video for Scientologists; or a Muslim painter who declines to paint 
the Stations of the Cross within a Roman Catholic cathedral. 
The creative professionals will serve all customers, but the very nature of the 
artistic endeavor is that no artist will ever be able to promote all messages 
through their works.  Were this not so, then the creative professional becomes 
an automaton, with no more investment in his or her art than Orwell’s Winston 
Smith was invested in the truth of the news articles that he was told to rewrite to 
suit the Party’s “truth” of the moment. 
But America is not Oceana: as Barnette famously put it, “[i]f there is any fixed 
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.”260 
As the Court has said, “[t]he whole point of the First Amendment is to protect 
individual speech that the majority might prefer to restrict, or that legislators or 
judges might not view as useful to the democratic process.”261  Indeed, 
“[h]owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on 
the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”262 
Ironically, today it is not a pernicious idea that is suppressed, but rather the 
idea that marriage is uniquely between one man and one woman.  That idea was 
recognized by our highest Court as “the foundation of the family and of society, 
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.”263 
When the government begins suppressing ideas, courts must step in to protect 
the debates which ultimately sort out truth.  As the Court said in NIFLA, “[t]he 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market.”264  And if it happens that the thought is brought to 
market via an artist’s hand wielding a painter’s brush and a baker’s whisk, the 
thought is no less protected by the First Amendment. 
Civil liberties travel together.  When powerful public figures of our age 
proclaim that “speech is violence,”265 or that ‘“[y]ou cannot be civil’” with 
political adversaries,266 it is time for free speech advocates to reject the siren 
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calls of censorship or coercion, and renew their commitment to protecting 
freedom for all, so that good ideas can succeed and bad ideas can fail—in plain 
view of the public, and without the government silencing one speaker or 
coercing another. 
If we all lose when the government decides which ideas prevail, then we all 
win when free speech and the free exercise of religion protects the debates which 
lead to truth. 
 
